Nicolas Sarkozy's Grand Paris project seeks through both physical design and administrative reorganization to radically rework the French capital's metropolitan area, including its infamous banlieues. In the first half of this paper, I examine the planning history of this "red belt," tracing the rise of a discourse of securitization, penalization, and a racialized "ghetto-ization," even while planning interventions attempted to bring economic prosperity and social integration to these neighborhoods through a disavowal of ethnic or cultural difference. In the second half of this paper, I examine the plans for the Grand Paris project, revealing the ways in which such star-architect, master-planning attempts do not in fact break with planning traditions, and instead contribute to differentiation and the disciplining of those populations deemed problematic by the Republic.
Introduction
In the fall of 2005, the banlieues were ablaze. Starting in Lyon and traveling outwards towards Paris, various working class neighborhoods throughout the country erupted in violence and incivility, as young people, often of immigrant descent, protested against a state that had long worked against their interests. Nicolas Sarkozy, then Minister of the Interior, condemned these acts, asserting the primacy of the state and the power of law and order. This response was telling: in the eyes of the state these youth were not an aggrieved population clamoring for attention, but rather urban inhabitants that needed discipline and control.
As part of his presidency, Nicolas Sarkozy wanted to reinvent his capital for the new millennium, taking in to account not just Paris proper, but also the famous city's vast hinterlands. In the spring of 2009, ten teams of architects unveiled their plans for a new 'Grand Paris.' Included in these plans were elaborate schemes to improve Paris' famous 'red belt' of banlieues, or public housing estates. These highly differentiated, often impoverished areas have become home to largely immigrant populations, leading some to re-identify the 'red belt' as the 'black belt' .
Implicit in both the state's efforts and the architects' resulting plans were ideas of immigrant integration and social control.
In this paper I want to focus on the histories of these areas and the ways in which the Grand Paris designs conceive of the 'problem' of the banlieue. Because these plans were the first to radically rethink the city of Paris within the context of its metropolitan area, they also represent the first large-scale planning effort to put forth solutions for the 'black belt' that were rooted not just in urban policy but also in physical design. Meanwhile, because of the ways in which French narratives of urban poverty in the banlieue have become inextricably bound up in questions around immigration and integration, these plans include implicit notions of integration and social control. Further, Sarkozy's plans for Paris come at a particular historical moment in which the state has increased the criminalization and penalization of immigrants, and reinforced the power of the central government. By excavating certain narratives in Paris' urban history, these plans reveal that integration in France has always been a spatial question, in which social mixite is the ultimate goal. However, even while the state often reiterates its anxieties over the potential for the 'ghetto-ization' of French cities, its policy prescriptions in other areas only further economic disadvantage and segregation. The confluence of metropolitan planning, urban policy, and immigration laws prevents spatial integration: the state fails to address the entrenched dynamics of race and class, while encouraging penalization of the ethnic other. This confluence of policy and planning ultimately heightens differentiation and inequality.
The Grand Paris in Context: Scholarship and Political Currents of Exclusion
Scholars of history, planning, and geography have long examined planning within the context of Paris and France, the way in which it operated as a tool of controlling unruly masses, and its effects on nation-building (Harvey 2003 , Scott 1998 , Weber 1977 . Another strain of scholarship has looked at the profound impact immigration and subsequent integration has had within the French context, often looking particularly at the ways immigration intersects and challenges the idea of the universalism of French citizenship (Hargreaves 2007 , Lewis 2007 , Brubaker 1992 , Noiriel 1996 , to name a few). Few scholars writing in English, however, have systematically interrogated the connections between immigration and integration, urban policy, and planning, the exception being Mustafa Dikeç's 2009 Badlands of the Republic, from which I will draw in this work.
Immigration in France, I would argue, has always been bound up with the urban scale. In her book A Small City in France, Françoise Gaspard, the former mayor of Dreux, details how her community came to support Le Pen and the Front National following the emergence of immigrant communities. We see in this instance how the immigrant debate in France emerged not from a vague fear of cultural change, but rather from anxieties over everyday encounters with the other. Returning to Paris and the banlieue, Dikeç points out how the image of the violent immigrant banlieue served as the impetus for the creation of unified urban policy following the 'hot summer' of 1981 (Dikeç 2007) . Indeed, this particular moment of incivility served not only to impel the central state to intervene in urban policy, but also to bring the question of immigration to the attention of an anxious French public (Marthaler 2008, p. 383) .
Meanwhile, the Grand Paris plans have received much praise and general coverage, without much critical interrogation. When the architects revealed their finished products in a great celebration in the spring of 2009, international news media covered their work breathlessly, marveling at the beautiful renderings and detailed models that heralded a new metropolitan age for the city. However, since the plans were unveiled, scholarship has paid little attention to these expansive urban visions. Furthermore, as the media praised these glossy images of the new metropolis in part because of their inclusiveness, the French state has garnered much attention precisely because of its exclusionary practices. In September 2009, the French police disbanded an immigrant camp in Calais and sent residents back to their native Pakistan and Bangladesh. This past summer, much of Europe was gripped by the President's decision to expel the Roma from their informal settlements and remove them from French territory. In the fall, as much of Paris protested austerity measures, the government passed a new law that would strip immigrants of their citizenship if they protested against the police. Because greater questions of immigrants' belonging-particularly within an urban, spatial context-are central to the recent decisions of the French state, we cannot look at the Grand Paris plans without examining who can and cannot occupy the spaces delineated within them. As a state project, Grand Paris constitutes part of this matrix of planning, policy, and control.
I hope to situate the recent policy decisions by the French state within the broader diegesis of urban and immigration histories. I treat the contemporary political aspirations and achievements of the Sarkozy presidency as emerging from a particular tradition of governance, rather than as rupture with the past. Thus while many in France have decried these movements towards penalization, criminalization, and exclusion as a break with traditions of republicanism and egalité, I hope to show how in fact they are a continuation of processes already underway.
The Geographies of Differentiated Equality
By law, the integration of an immigrant into French society is equated wholly with citizenship. Once the immigrant has gained that crucial document that declares him or her to be French, the integration process is ostensibly complete: the individual becomes a legal citizen of the state, one who can put forth claims and reap the benefits of membership within the polity. This perpetuates a myth that "assumes that institutions 'naturally' integrate immigrants" (Sala Pala 2010 , p. 1792 . Other countries in Europe have extensive training programs for their immigrant residents to ensure migrants learn the local language and culture. Further programs assist with housing and workforce placement. In France, however, these kinds of programs are anathema. A 1993 law, L'Integration a la française, proclaimed boldly that assimilation in France is "based on a principle of equality, contrasts with the 'logic of minorities' that confers specific status on national or ethnic minorities," and "asserts the equality of men across the diversity of their cultures" (Kastoryano 2002, p. 40) . Once the immigrant gains entrance, any kind of collective identity is that of French citizen, without the particularities and peculiarities of ethnic difference. This policy is in contrast to the kind of multicultural policies practiced in the Netherlands or Britain, in which difference is tolerated. Noiriel writes that the terms "immigrant" and "immigration" "are completely inscribed in the legal opposition between French citizen and foreigner" (Noiriel 1996, p. 45) . Within the eyes of the law, an immigrant who gains citizenship thus ceases to be an immigrant, thus erasing and excluding his or her past.
Immigrants in the City
Law and the discourse of citizenship proclaim the universalism of the individual, emphasizing the idioms of equality and the brotherhood of humankind. Yet in practice, immigrants have found starkly different benefits from their native counterparts, as is evidenced by their economic attainment and the geography of their settlement and territorial belonging. Since the 1970s, the forces of economic restructuring, racism, and urban housing policy have colluded to create a new landscape of inequality and differentiated access.
In the 1950s, faced with concentrated poverty that enveloped the capital city, the French state created new urban policies to tackle the problem of housing the poor. Like many older European metropolises, Paris' urban poor lived in impoverished, informal housing outside the city center. These bidonvilles sprouted liked weeds, enclosing the glamorous city in a ring of poverty (Dikeç 2007; Hargreaves 2007) . Postwar urban Disciplining the Metropolis development could not adequately accommodate the poor, many of whom were immigrants. Because of this depressed geography of poverty, in 1950 the state mounted an ambitious project to create public housing estates, known as Habitation a Loyer Modéré (HLMs). In the 1960s and early 1970s, the government created 195 planned housing estates, mostly in Paris. These housing estates, the banlieues, were remote and poorly equipped with services. Then in the late 1970s, the French government created policies that encouraged home ownership among the lower middle classes. Those with means moved out of the banlieues, leaving empty units that would soon be occupied by more disadvantaged people, who were often new immigrants (Dikeç 2007) . Because of the restructuring of the economy, meanwhile, these new residents were often poorer than past generations of the working poor, and had even fewer opportunities.
Furthermore, while discussions of race within the French context-as opposed to debates in Britain, the Netherlands, or the United Statesare largely discouraged, concepts of race persist, influencing the opportunities of ethnic minorities. Immigration in France has provoked scholarship that "has tended to emphasize class status and regional culture over racial difference," even while discourse on immigration in the city has adopted the language of racial struggles in America (Stovall 2003, p. 360) . Race, in the French context, matters. Discrimination is a substantive part of daily life for many immigrant communities in France. A recent study found that in employment practices, employers were far less likely to select candidates with Muslim names but the same experience as their white, French competitors (Adida et al 2010) . Similar kinds of discrimination are evident in the housing market, where landlords and estate agents express unwillingness to accommodate immigrant populations (Hargreaves 2007) . Anti-immigrant sentiments thus serve to exacerbate the already unfortunate combination of economic disadvantage and poor housing stock.
Before I explore the history of how the banlieue became particularly disadvantaged both economically and socially, we need to understand exactly how these areas can be thought of as particularly immigrant and ethnically distinct. First, forty percent of immigrant workers are employed as manual laborers, and a significant portion, or almost twenty percent of the entire immigrant workforce, is unskilled labor, as opposed to 25 and 8 percent, respectively, among French natives (Hargreaves 2007, p. 46) . Further, the majority of the immigrants employed in those sectors are from North and Sub-Saharan Africa, while around 35 percent of the members of those groups are completely unemployed, as opposed to around twelve percent of native French people. Meanwhile, immigrants are predominantly concentrated in certain areas. Almost forty percent of the immigrant population of France lives in the Paris conurbation, while the same can be said for only fifteen percent of native French (Hargreaves 2007) . Around 35 percent of both Algerian and Moroccan households live in an HLM. This confluence of race, class, and geography mean that the suburbs of Paris are often marked by ethnically diverse population and low economic attainment. Thus, beyond the hysteria of the ghetto, urban crime, and the immigrant other, we can discuss the banlieue as a site of immigrant livelihood, where much of France's newest populations strive to create their urban futures.
Urban Histories, Urban Narratives
In the sixty years since the creation of the HLMs, French policy has served to deepen the inequalities in the banlieues. In public opinion, encouraged by a discourse that draws upon the Republicanism of the French state, these areas have become synonymous with a kind of dangerous urban pathology. Policy and opinion reinforce one another. This confluence, meanwhile, increasingly disarticulates the banlieues from the general polity, putting residents at a distinct disadvantage. While the French state declared the universalism of the Republic in theory, in practice urban policy managed to separate the banlieues, designating them as spaces of control and discipline.
After an initial plan of small-scale intervention failed, the state decided that economic achievement was the only means to ameliorate conditions in the banlieue. This quantified strategy "was conceived almost exclusively in economic terms and with an exclusive focus on delimited neighborhoods as neatly defined, exclusive, and calculable spaces of intervention" (ibid p. 71).
1 In 1996, the rightist government created the Pacte de relance pour la Ville, an urban policy that designated impoverished areas as special economic zones. As Dikeç points out, this strategy meant that the state conceived of the banlieues as separate entities whose marginalization, poverty, and exclusion could be de-articulated from broader structural forces. Urban policy managed to unbind particular localities from the broader metropolitan landscape. To achieve the economic success prescribed by policy, the state made many of these areas in to "national spaces that seek to attract investment with tax incentives, lower labor standards, and the dismantling of social rights," creating "urban spaces that are treated as development zones, 'reservations,' even 'dumping grounds'" (Balibar 2007, p. 58) . The economic strategies it inflicted upon the banlieues allowed the greater French economy to exploit them while furthering differentiation. The universalism of French citizenship did not extend to the quotidian economic practices of the banlieue.
This kind of governance served to encourage negative discourse on the banlieues in particular and on immigration in general. Stovall points to frenzied discussions of whether France had developed a "ghetto," using American language to describe the urban experience (Stovall 2003, p. 361) . By appropriating foreign idioms of poverty and racialization, debates in the popular press and policy circles encouraged the idea that the banlieue was antithetical to France, a separate problem that arose not from internal structures but rather some foreign element. Simultaneous to these discussions of poverty and the "black belt," French discourse on immigration included strains of what Balibar and Wallerstein label "new racism," which posits the incompatibility of immigrant groups, particularly Muslims, and Judeo-Christian Europeans (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991 ). An idea of discordance between immigrants and the French urban experience infused dialogues on both space and belonging. To prevent the creation of a ghetto, urban policy tried to encourage mixite, by designating quotas for low income housing in new construction, thus promoting the spatial diffusion of immigrant families. This project, in the end, was not very successful (Dikeç 2006 ).
As concerns related to 'ghetto-ization' increased, urban policy conspired with changes in policing and ideas of security to encourage racist tendencies and deepen the divide between the banlieue and the rest of the French urban experience. Within French politics of the late 1970s, politicians decided to separate crime from the perception of crime, which they labeled "insecurity" (Bonelli 2002, p. 102) . As this idea grew to prominence in the 1990s, urban politics began to speak of these fears and insecurities, which originated not from fact, but from highly subjective daily experiences championed by politicians on the right looking to further their political goals. One politician labeled the banlieues "outlaw areas," an idea that helped reinforce the notion of anti-Republican spaces that pose dangerous threats to the general polity.
Urban policy began to stress ideas of security and of relying on police power as a means of guarantee. In treating the banlieues as separate entities of insecurity, urban policy designated these areas as criminal, deepening inequalities and obliterating opportunities. Crucial to this new period of policy was the collaboration between the Ministry of the City and the Ministry of Justice: in the eyes of the state, the banlieue required the intervention of its law enforcement division. The banlieues became, in the schema set forth by this unholy alliance, spaces in which the police should obliterate violence. One policy created highly localized Maisons de Justice et du droit, designed to maintain order 'through a rapid, on the spot, treatment of delinquency in ''sensitive neighbourhoods"' (Dikeç 2006, p. 75) . Within this "securitarian maelstrom," "everything becomes threatening and uncertainty turns to fear," a condition that "increases racism and distrust" (Bonelli 2002, p. 117) . The discourse of security and law and order was abetted by the state's turn towards penalization (Wacquant 2006 , Terrio 2007 . The penal state, meanwhile, has exhibited marked discrimination towards immigrants and ethnic minorities (Terrio 2007 (Terrio , 2009 ). The transition from social state to penal state meant that these impoverished suburbs were transformed in the eyes of the state into insecure areas in need of control, where poor immigrant families were subjected to the rule of law.
Against this landscape of inequality, the experience of immigrant inhabitants in the banlieues has only worsened. Scholars have largely dismissed the comparison between banlieues and ghettos, pointing to the higher heterogeneity, smaller size and density, and lack of access to handguns within the former as a means of distinguishing as different from the latter (Wacquant 2006) . The logic of the banlieue is not race, but rather class, which in the case of post-Fordist France often coincides with immigrant communities. Obviously, different national regimes, urban policies, and ethnic compositions give rise to separate typologies. Nevertheless, the banlieue, like the ghetto, is often highly segregated, ethnically distinct from the surrounding urban areas, and plagued with a dearth of opportunities, economic and otherwise. Tangible numbers speak to this fact. Between 1990 and 1999, unemployment increased from around an already high 20 percent to around 26 percent in the zones urbaines sensibles. Further, segregation increased for North and Black Africans within these areas (Ké Shon 2010). As economically disadvantaged areas marked by ethnic segregation, the banlieues continue to trouble French society and remain central to discourse on the city.
The Urban Poor into Parisiens
In his seminal work on French nation-building, Eugen Weber looked at the ways in which the state articulated its power throughout the countryside, turning Peasants into Frenchmen (1977) . Through a variety of tactics, Paris, synonymous with the central state, radiated power outwards, creating collective identity in a nation that had long been marked profoundly by regional differences. Central to this project was a spatial reorganization of territory that connected the capital city to her hinterlands. By building highways and railroads, France was able to create a spatial unity through which nationalism could flow freely.
The notion of opening up, of articulating passageways for the free movement of goods, services, and bodies, remains central to Sarkozy's plans for a new Paris. In a political climate that isolated Paris from its suburbs, looking to the greater metropolitan area proved a means of combating this disarticulation and bringing outer Paris into the purview of the capital. In their plans for a new, metropolitan Paris, the ten teams Disciplining the Metropolis of star architects offer means of developing tangible connections between the city and suburbs, putting forth visions of an area integrated not just economically but also demographically and socially. Integration, in the context of Grand Paris, means the prevention of class-and racedifferentiated socio-spatial geographies.
However, any promise of a new social harmony is undermined by the central state's securitization plans for Grand Paris. Indeed, these new physical plans ultimately serve as a means of furthering policies of control and discipline, and continue French planning traditions of making the city legible for the purposes of law and order.
The underlying integration project these proposals entail can be both obvious and more subtle: these architects seek to reshape the experience of the banlieue, drawing its residents into the city's body politic and eliminating the violence within. In both their detailed plans, star architects Jean Nouvel and Richard Rogers include long discourses on the banlieue. Nouvel enlists the help of Alain Fleischer, a French intellectual, to opine on the subject. Rogers relies on Sophie Body-Gendrot, an academic who works on urban studies, to describe the banlieues and their often violent histories.
2 Other teams were more subtle in their descriptions of the geographic fragmentation of the Paris area. Roland Castro's team, in their synopsis, rejects "the privatized city that opposes the equality of rights for citizens," and "the very serious spatial and temporal discontinuities, ruptures, and enclaves. The Descartes group wants to "open up the grands ensembles" and encourage "the right to the city and to the metropolis."
While not all ten plans deliberately mention the banlieues and the perceived social problems they contain, they all refer to the isolation and inequality experienced by many of the suburbs; physical, tangible connection to Paris is a central part of their proposed solutions for this problem. In Dutch MVRDV's scheme, new highways slink seductively through the city; a promotional video shows the metropolitan area in blue and white, largely abstract, as these new routes morph from nothing to connect the outlying regions to the center of Paris (Figure 1) .
3 Atelier Cristian Portzamparc, meanwhile, envisions an elevated air train that will 2. Note: By looking at the different voices used in these plans, we can see how architects rely on distinct epistemologies that influence their prescriptions. For example, in her book The Social Control of Cities?, Body-Gendrot largely ascribes the problems of the banlieue to environmental factors arising from globalization (Body-Gendrot 2000) , and "theorizes deviance as the product of economic marginality, social disorganization, and the cultural poverty of enclaved, ethnic (i.e. immigrant) neighbourhoods" (Ossman and Terrio 2006, p. 12) . The idea of a "culture of poverty" is evident, and the cure becomes a project of undoing these environmental factors. 3. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lyvSzmBkg9s. "MVRDV vision for Grand Paris: Pari(s) Plus Petit."
carry bodies about the urban fabric through the metropolitan area to new railroad stations, superimposing an innovative, inclusive network upon the old infrastructure of the bourgeois capital (Figure 2 ). These trains would be able to bring people rapidly into the center of the city, making the distance between suburb and center negligible. 4 Richard Rogers and his team pepper their plans with renderings for new boulevards to run through industrial suburbs, both developing a vibrant street life as well as creating monumental thoroughfares integrating suburb to city (Figure 3 ).
5
The Lin team imagines the metropolis as a series of nodes that need to be connected in a network to encourage diversity and movement (Figure 4) . Throughout these plans, the architects mention the disarticulation between the small capital city and its massive suburban landscape; infrastructure projects that connect the two become one way of bridging this divide.
In Splintering Urbanism, Graham and Marvin argue that infrastructure provision was a previously neutral enterprise that city builders undertook to the benefit of all citizens (Graham and Marvin 2001) . A similar ethos is at work in the Grand Paris plans. All ten architecture teams envision these kinds of infrastructure projects that could knit together the urban fabric, connecting disparate parts of a splintered whole. In Graham and Marvin's analytic, infrastructure provision has become a mechanism of inequality, distributed with great variation. In Grand Paris, on the other hand, infrastructure provision proves to be a means of erasing inequality and allowing equal access. Integration thus becomes an exercise in constructing connections that break up what many still think of as a ghetto: spatial integration is key. The Descartes group, for example, when talking about connecting the suburbs to the city, both with transportation and governance, illustrate their work with images from the Paris metropolitan area. On one page, two black men in Evry walk by a largely empty sports facility with a shabby looking apartment block in the background. On the next page, an image depicts various people, all white, at a lookout point with a view of the Eiffel tower (Descartes 2009, pp. 90-92) . The implication is clear: these plans will connect these two worlds, one dingy and unassuming, the other clean and celebrated. With new transportation services, inhabitants of Evry can now enjoy the sites and pleasures of the capital city.
The environment also emerges as a primary mechanism for improving conditions within the city throughout these plans. All ten plans include some provision for beautifying the banlieues through place-making urban design projects. Roland Castro's plans feature urban parks in places like La Courneuve, its lush green revitalizing the old industrial landscape of a dis-invested banlieue ( Figure 5 ). The old suburb will thus become a verdant paradise, where children can play among the tall trees. Rogers' team proposes creating a vast terrain of roof gardens to break the monotony of concrete and brick. These gardens will inject colorful spurts of nature into the previously mundane experience of urban life. Both ideas postulate that these new green utopias will create a sense of place, encouraging a sense of ownership and belonging. L'AUC, a firm led by the Algerian-born Djamel Klouche, proposes not only to create new green spaces, but also to penetrate the facades of the old blocks of HLMs ( Figure 6 ) by encasing the buildings with airy windows, letting in light to illuminate interiors and ease the feeling of isolation.
However, the ten Paris plans will not improve the banlieue simply by connecting it to Paris through infrastructure and improving it physically with greenery. The revolutionary part of the Grand Paris proposal, which runs throughout all plans, is the idea of creating a meta-governance structure that could unite the region, thus drawing both banlieue and capital under the same umbrella. Each team makes explicit the need to rethink urban governance: the Grand Paris cannot come to fruition without major changes in the ways in which the state manages this territory. The teams put forth differing ideas postulating how to create a larger governing body with various responsibilities, but the general idea remains the same. Governance can no longer reside with local municipalities, which often fail to build consensus on shared issues.
Sarkozy's Paris: Law and Order
While these plans present utopic imaginaries for a new metropolis, the state's actual movements and decisions further the rationality of penalization, control, and discipline. Further, while these ten architects develop an optimistic integration project of connections and equality, Sarkozy's current policies on immigration encourage criminalization and punishment, dictating which bodies will then be allowed to inhabit this new Paris. The state thus continues to exacerbate differentiation in conflict with abstract republican universalism.
While the state unveiled the Grand Paris plans in high style in the spring of 2009, the real, tangible changes in the metropolitan area were markedly less glamorous. As the New York Times reported in an article on the Grand Paris project, Sarkozy was remaking the city not only through glittering architecture and fertile new green belts, but also through a "Grand Paris of police." 6 The idea of creating a coordinated, regional organization to govern Paris here becomes a reality: a super prefecture would command all aspects of policing. While a regional organization for urban governance and planning would prove difficult to pass in the French assembly, Sarkozy had little difficulty creating this new police system, which the state deemed a necessity. 7 The state ordered these measures, meanwhile, because while the banlieues were distinct, bounded areas, they could not contain their populations. Sarkozy said, upon the creation of the new police unit, "Only 45 percent of delinquents live in the interior of the capital… Delinquents don't have borders." 8 In the words of the right-of-center newspaper Le Figaro, this effort was meant to "combat from the root the increasingly rough delinquency that plays out on the frontiers of the periphery" by adding 400,000 new police officers.
9
Coupled with the already brutal condition of the French penal state, this new measure sends a clear message regarding integration and citizenship within the capital city. French youth, particularly of immigrant origins, face increasingly harsh penalties for any act deemed delinquent by the state (Wacquant 2006 , Terrio 2009 ). These new measures mean increased vigilance and surveillance in the impoverished areas of the region. Further, the new coordinated prefecture creates an expanded zone of command and control, subjecting 'delinquent' populations to an evergrowing space of discipline. Meanwhile, this measure puts forth an analytic that assumes delinquency flows from the peripheral areas of the poor banlieues to the center, inscribing criminality and misbehavior onto the geography of the banlieues. Residents who might travel from the periphery to the center can undertake that free movement only if they ascribe to the rules set out by the long arms of the law. In one sense, the banlieue experiences an opening up, as the conditions of crime and punishment are no longer deemed specific to those geographies.
The rules to which these 'peripheral' bodies must abide are increasingly repressive, prescribing certain ontologies of behavior and activity within the metropolis. With the country embroiled in a series of contentious affairs, Sarkozy announced he would reconsider policies towards immigration and citizenship. A new series of legislation introduced in the summer of 2010 included measures to strip immigrants of their citizenship if they were involved in protest against the police. Previously, the state had stripped citizenship only in cases of treason or terrorism; this new law thus rendered citizenship more fragile and fleeting. The New York Times notes that this law seems particularly designed to target Muslims, as the interior minister "helpfully added polygamy and female circumcision to the list of offenses that could bring a loss of citizenship." easier to deport people who "threaten public order, have no durable means of supporting themselves or abuse the right of free movement." 11 European Union citizens were included in this new act. Furthermore, the parameters by which one would be judged for deportation were remarkably flexible and subjective: concepts of "public order" are vague, leaving much up to the interpretation of the state. Ultimately, certain disadvantaged inhabitants of this 21 st century metropolis must continue to bear the repressive weight of the state's surveillance apparatus while simultaneously adhering to new rules that dictate how they can behave within the city.
While the future of the banlieue is certainly not written, these new measures create certain conditions that might prove to further differentiation and fragmentation. While transportation linkages will give the inhabitants of the banlieue better physical access to other parts of the metropolis, the state has not outlined a coherent policy that would create more access for employment, improved housing, or educational attainment. The physical mixing of immigrants and French does not address bigger issues of inclusion and social mobility. Rather, with the provision of more police presence, the banlieue will probably continue to be a space for the command and control of delinquent denizens. Further, these new laws regarding immigration will heighten distrust; immigrants moving through the metropolitan area may encounter increased hostility, thus encouraging the dreaded ethnic enclave.
Conclusion
In imagining a modern, efficient, and monumental Paris, Baron Haussmann sought to make the medieval city legible, rendering the complex urban fabric orderly and understandable (Scott 1998; Clark 1985) . Such a project not only articulated a new urban form, but also articulated the vast power of the new nation-state. As Scott reminds us, it also transformed the experiences of daily life and allowed for new means of state surveillance. Like Hausmannization, the Grand Paris project, conceived by star architects and the French presidency, has the potential to substantively alter the everyday, providing new services and opportunities to disadvantaged members of the population. However, as in the 19 th century City of Light, it also enhances the state's ability to command and control its urban space. While Paris of the 20 th century is far more heterogeneous than that of Louis Napoleon, deep class divisions remain, and the response for controlling an unruly proletariat-whether composed of potential communards or seemingly delinquent youth of 11. "Sarkozy promises law to strip citizenship from cop killers," France 24. http:// www.france24.com/en/20100906-sarkozy-law-strip-citizenship-cop-killersfrance-immigrants-roma-crime Algerian extraction-remains markedly similar. Police power continues to maintain a central role in the management of urban space.
Unfortunately, this police power is unequally distributed, frustrating the French integration project. In many ways, the policing of Paris relies on difference, of identifying the peripheral banlieue inhabitants as distinct from other French citizens. Yet in the abstract understanding of the universalism of French citizenship and rights, "differences are treated as aberrations of French norms rather than as complex products of French and transnational societal relationships" (Lewis 2007, p. 253) . In theory, all people are equal and thus subject to the same rules and regulations; however, the state targets particular individuals in carrying out policies. What is anathema in the abstract is condoned in practice. While abstract discourse on belonging to the national polity disavows difference, metropolitan governance and securitization reifies it. This reification of difference, in turn, furthers spatial segregation and geographic fragmentation, inscribing discrimination onto the body of the city.
In parallel to these currents of segregation, inequality, and criminalization, French sentiments towards immigration are increasingly hostile. Le Pen's anti-immigrant politics, while rejected at the polls, has been incredibly powerful in framing the discourse around immigration (Sala Pala 2010). The majority of the French public agreed with Sarkozy's new laws this fall. Even while mixite is a utopian goal, many, it would seem, do not want a system that enfolds their immigrant brethren into French polity. Universalism, once again, remains a myth that offers powerful mechanisms of exclusion. 
